• 二战德国 二战德国历史网摘 >> 外文资料 >> The loss of U 325, U 400 and U 1021 Re-assessment of German U-boat losses in World War II
  • The loss of U 325, U 400 and U 1021 Re-assessment of German U-boat losses in World War II

  • 作者:Dr. Axel Niestlé  来源:net  日期:2007-10-17 8:56:55  浏览:
  • (All Times are Central European Time (GMT + 1))

    14 February 2004
    amended on 17 October 2006 and 11 May 2007

    Note: This report and the conclusions therein are protected by copyright and/or other intellectual property laws, and any unauthorized use of the material may violate such laws. No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author.

    During the period 1990 to 2001 three wartime wrecks of German WWII Type VIIC U-boats have been discovered by the private divers L F Welch and Innes McCartney off the Cornish Coast in the following wreck positions:

    No 1: 50°39,8 N / 05°05 W
    No 2: 50°33,3 N / 05°11,6 W
    No 3: 50°32,4 N / 05°23,2 W

    According to the official list on German U-boat losses during World War II, published jointly by the British Admiralty and the Cominch US Navy in 1946, no German U-boats were recorded as wartime losses in these waters. A thorough examination of all German U-boat losses revealed that until the end of November 1944 all boats recorded as lost after having been directed to operate off the Cornish coast are known sunk in other areas. After November 1944 several more Type VIIC boats received explicit orders to operate in the general area off the Cornish coast between Lands End and Milford Haven. Of these, U 400, U 1021 and U 325 did not return.

    U 400 (Kapitänleutnant Horst Creutz) left Kristiansand South on 18 November 1944 for its first war patrol. There is no record of any signals having been received from U 400 after the boat had been released at 2030 on the same day by UJ 1101 at point »Krista« (58°01,3n/06°40,5e). This procedure was not unusual for that time of the U-boat campaign when boats travelled completely submerged and avoided to use radio signals for fear of being monitored and located by shore or ship-borne direction finding systems. On 28 November 1944 U-boat Command advised the boat to proceed to naval grid square AM 70 as a steering area. No passage report on passing to the west of Ireland was requested. On 4 December 1944 the boat was ordered to patrol along the coastal waterway North East of Lands End. Based on the average consumption of fuel and provisions U-boat Command reckoned with its return to base on or about 30 December 1944. In order to get urgently needed information about the operational situation in the Bristol Channel and to evaluate the technical features of the prototype 3.7 cm AA-gun Type 43 fitted to U 400, the boat was ordered repeatedly in the following days to send a report on experiences. On 19 January 1945 it was routinely allocated to Stavanger as the port of destination at the end of its patrol. When U 400 failed to return to port it was posted as missing at the end of January 1945 with effect from 3 January 1945. No information about the cause of its loss was then available to U-boat Command.

    After the war the Allied A/S Assessment Committee attributed the loss of U 400 to a depth charge attack by the frigate HMS Nyasaland at 2315 on the 17 December 1944 in the position 51°16N/08°05W. The frigate was part of Escort Group 18 to escort the outbound passenger ship Rimutaka, carrying HRHs the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester to Australia. At 2315 Nyasaland obtained a strong asdic contact at 2.500 yards and at 2338 attacked with a pattern of ten depth charges. At 2358 a Hedgehog attack was carried out, resulting in at least seven explosions nine seconds after the projectiles had hit the water. This was followed quickly by a violent underwater explosion. After the attack oil came to the surface. Based on the reported details, the attack was graded as „B – probably sunk“ by the Committee. The post-war identification of the target as U 400 is, however, open to question. The attribution was apparently based on the wrong assumption, derived from Ultra signal intelligence, that U 400 should have been the only U-boat to operate in this area at the time. From U-boat Commands daily plot it is obvious that U 400 should have passed the position of attack already about a week earlier on its way to its assigned patrol area. Although the destruction of a U-boat in the action appears very likely, the probability for the presence of U 400 is only remote. Recent research by the author now indicates that HMS Nyasaland very probably sank U 772 on this date.

    U 1021 (Oberleutnant zur See William Holpert) left Bergen on 20 February 1945 for its first war patrol in British inshore waters following an abortive attempt in mid-February due to schnorkel failure. There is no record of any signals having been received from U 1021 after the boat had left port. On 1 March 1945 U-boat Command advised the boat to proceed towards the southern edge of naval grid square AM 70 as a steering area. On 8 March 1945 U 1021 was finally allocated to the operational area along the coastal convoy route on both sides of Lands End from naval grid square BF 2251 (off Pentire Head) to BF 2371 (Bigbury Bay). The focus of operations was to be in square BF 2198, which is the area between Cape Cornwall/Pendeen Head and Cape Cornwall Bank. Although U 1021 failed to answer a request on 10 March 1945 to sent its routine passage report when passing to the west of Ireland on its way South, U-boat Command nevertheless believed the boat to have arrived in its operational area. On 14 April 1945, assuming U 1021 to have by then already commenced its return to base, it was routinely allocated to Trondheim as the port of destination. When the boat failed to return to port, it was posted as missing on 5 May 1945 with effect from the same day. No information about the cause of its loss was then available to U-boat Command.